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A PERSON attempting to minimize the tax assessment on the
devolution of his estate must necessarily consider the state tax
liability as well as the federal tax assessment. In Texas, the absence
of a state income or gift tax restricts the scope of an examination to
death taxes. Hence, this Article will review in detail the Texas death
taxes which are important to any estate plan.
The Texas Legislature has enacted both an inheritance' and an
estate2 tax to be levied on property passing at death. In distinguishing
between inheritance and estate taxes, it should be remembered that
an inheritance tax is assessed on the right of succession to property,'
while an estate tax is imposed on the right of the grantor to transfer
property.4 To the extent that state taxes bear directly upon estate
planning decisions, the inheritance tax is primarily important. The
Texas estate tax is assessed only to assure the maximum credit per-
mitted for payment of state death taxes in computing the federal
estate tax liability5 and is seldom of any consequence in estate plan-
ning decisions.' Therefore, the subsequent analysis shall essentially
be restricted to an examination of the Texas inheritance tax and its
impact on an estate plan.
*B.B.A., LL.B., Southern Methodist University; LL.M., Harvard University; presently
with Tax Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this
Article do not reflect those of the Department of Justice.
Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959).
Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 15.01 (1959). Though this tax is labeled an "Additional
Inheritance Tax" by the statute, it is an estate tax by definition and for purposes of this
Article will be classified as an estate tax. See Strauss v. Calvert, 246 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952-Austin) error ref. n.r.e.
aKnowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); State v. Hogg, 123 Tex. 568, 72 S.W.2d
593 (1934).
4
Bethea v. Sheppard, 143 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940-Austin) error ref.
'See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2011.
' For a situation when the Texas estate tax is an important consideration see note 150,
infra.
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I. PROBLEMS OF THE GROSS ESTATE
A. Powers Of Appointment
A power of appointment8 is important in the consideration of any
estate plan.' Through the proper employment of such a power,
otherwise unavailable flexibility may be obtained."0 The proper utili-
zation of a power of appointment requires decisions concerning the
creation of powers as well as the possible exercise of powers already
possessed by the person whose estate is being planned.
In Texas an inheritance tax is assessed on property passing under
a general power of appointment exercised by the decedent in a will.1
Therefore it is necessary to distinguish between a general and a
special"a power of appointment. Any power classified as a special
power, or any power, general or special, exercised by the donee inter
vivos, will not be subject to a Texas tax.'
For example, suppose A transfers property in trust with the in-
come to B for life, then to such person or persons as B may appoint
inter vivos or by will, and in default of appointment, the property
shall pass equally to C's children. In an estate plan involving the
property of B, only compelling reasons should prevent an inter vivos
exercise of the power. Thus, the Texas inheritance tax could possibly
' Since this Article deals with estate planning the following discussion will be in relation
to powers created after October 21, 1942. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041 (a) (2). For
the provision relating to powers created on or before October 21, 1942, see Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 2041 (a) (1).
' A power of appointment is a power created or reserved by a person (the donor) having
property subject to his disposition enabling the donee of the power to designate, within
such limits as the donor may prescribe, the transferees of the property or the shares in
which it shall be received.
The term, power of appointment, does not include a power of sale, a power of attorney,
a power of revocation, a power to cause a gift of income to be augmented out of principal,
a power to designate charities, a charitable trust, a discretionary trust, or an honorary
trust. See Republic Nat'l Bank v. Fredericks, 155 Tex. 79, 283 S.W.2d 39 (1955); see
also Restatement, Property S 318 (1940).
OCasner, Estate Planning 689 (3d ed. 1961).
'o Ibid.
a"Tex. Tax--Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959) provides for the inheritance tax to be
assessed on "All property . . . including property passing under a general power of appoint-
ment exercised by the decedent by will. ... (Emphasis added.)
"5A power is general if, being exercisable before the death of the donee, it can be
wholly in favor of the donee or, being testamentary, it can be exercised wholly in favor
of the estate of the donee. Restatement, Property § 320(1) (1940).
asA power is special if it can be exercised only in favor of persons, not including the
donee, who constitute a group not unreasonably large and the donor does not manifest
an intent to create or reserve the power primarily for the benefit of the donee. Restatement,
Property S 320(2) (1940).
"See Sheppard v. Desmond, 169 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943-Austin) no writ
hist. Of course an inheritance tax will be imposed on the property if it is deemed a transfer
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after the death of the grantor or it is
found to be a transfer made in contemplation of death within the meaning of the statute.
See Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959).
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affect any decision regarding the exercise of a general power. Indeed,
under certain circumstances the inheritance tax on the testamentary
exercise of a general power may be greater than the federal gift tax
on an inter vivos exercise of that power."
Also, in the creation as well as the exercise of a general power,
inter vivos disposition of the property should not be dismissed with-
out careful consideration. Flexibility in the estate plan is more readily
ascertained with an inter vivos power, and the inheritance tax ad-
vantage is apparent.
An additional consideration in the creation or exercise of a general
power of appointment is the passing of the property in default of
appointment. Since the Texas inheritance tax is assessed only upon
an "exercise" of a general power by will,'" the donee of such a power
should not exercise the power if the takers in default of appoint-
ment consist of persons whom the donee wishes to benefit." Further-
more, if the gift in default of appointment meets the donee's ap-
proval, no inter vivos gifts should consist of property subject to the
power; in such a situation the donee will not incur a Texas tax on
property transferred inter vivos, s and the property passing in de-
fault of appointment will not be subject to the inheritance tax." By
prudent planning, the donee of the power may thus avoid payment
of any taxes in transferring the property."0 Therefore, the possibility
isSuppose A is made the income beneficiary of a trust for life with a general power
over the trust corpus exercisable either by inter vivos or testamentary dispositions and with
a gift in default of appointment to X. The value of the property is $100,000. A testamentary
exercise of the power to A's wife will permit an inheritance tax assessment of $1,250.
See Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.02 (1959). The federal gift tax (after applying the
gift tax marital deduction, specific exemption, and annual exclusion) upon an inter vivos
exercise of the power, however, will be only $952. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2502-23.
leTex. Tax--Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959).
" Suppose A is the life beneficiary of a trust with a general power over the corpus;
in default of appointment the property will pass to A's children. This case presents a
classical situation wherein the donee of the power, A, should permit the property to pass
in default of appointment and thereby avoid the Texas inheritance tax. See Tex. Tax-
Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959).
s It is assumed that the transfer is not intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after death of the donee, nor is the transfer one in contemplation of death, since in
both instances the inheritance tax would be assessed. See Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.01
(1959).
1Tex. Tax-Gen, Ann. art. 14.01 (1959).
"o For example, W, a widow, has property valued at $200,000 and a life interest with
a general power of appointment in a $200,000 trust created by her husband, H. The corpus
of the trust passes to the children of H and W upon default of appointment of the property.
W institutes an inter vivos gift program to pass one-half the property, $200,000, to the
children during her life. By utilizing property outside the trust to make the inter vivos
gifts, no Texas tax is imposed on the inter vivos transfers; furthermore, there will be no
inheritance tax on the passing of the $200,000 in default of appointment. See Tex. Tax-
Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959). The federal estate and gift taxes will be the same, irrespective
of what property is transferred inter vivos by W.
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of allowing the property to pass in default of appointment should
be utilized unless other factors override the tax advantage.
21
Whenever an estate plan calls for the property subject to a power
to pass in default of appointment, a provision in the donee's will
should specifically negate any intention to exercise the power."
Though the Texas rule requires that the intent to exercise a power be
so clear that no other reasonable intent may be imputed under the
will, 3 the uncertainty in determining a testator's intent suggests that
a specific provision rejecting the exercise of the power will not be
superfluous.
The Texas case of Calvert v. Thompson" appears to justify a
devise or bequest of a life estate with a general power of appoint-
ment in every case in which an absolute gift is contemplated. In
that case the court refused to consider an unlimited power of in-
vasion possessed by a life tenant in assessing the inheritance tax, but
the basis of the tax assessment was held to be the value of the life
interest and the remainder without reference to the power.2 As in
the case of a life tenant with a power of invasion, it has long been
the Texas rule that a life estate is not enlarged because it is coupled
with a general power of appointment. 0 Therefore, the creation of
a general power of appointment should not only permit the property
to pass in default of appointment by the donee without being sub-
ject to inheritance tax, but the power should reduce the Texas in-
"' For a discussion of the question concerning whether to exercise a power of appoint-
ment, see Casner, op. cit. supra note 9, at 699.
22 Casner, op. cit. supra note 9, at 695.
23Republic Nat'l Bank v. Fredericks, 155 Tex. 79, 283 S.W.2d 39 (1955). The court,
in deciding whether or not a power had been exercised, stated:
The tests are (1) where there is a reference to the power in the instrument;
(2) where there is a reference to the property on which it is subject to be
executed; and (3) where the provisions of the will or deed executed by the
donee would otherwise be ineffectual; i.e., would have no operation except as
an execution of the power.
The general rule is that in order for a will or deed to constitute the exercise
of a power of appointment the intent to exercise such power must be so clear
that no other reasonable intent can be imputed under the will. The will must
refer to the power of appointment or to the property subject to such power,
or the donee of the power must have owned no other property to which the
will could have attached and thus the will have been a vain and useless thing
except it be held to be an exercise of the power. (Citations omitted.). . . . If,
from the circumstances or the instrument executed, it be doubtful as to
whether it was the intention to execute the power possessed by the grantor,
then it will not be held that by such act or conveyance that power was in
fact executed. Hill v. Conrad, 91 Tex. 341, 43 S.W. 789 (1897). 155 Tex.
at 89-90, 283 S.W.2d at 47.
24 3;9 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960-Austin) error ref.
25Id. at 688.
2 5 Edds v. Mitchell, 143 Tex. 307, 184 S.W.2d 823, 158 A.L.R. 470 (1945); Weir v.
Smith, 62 Tex. 1 (1884); Arnold v. Southern Pine Lumber Co., $8 Tex. Civ. App. 186,
123 S.W. 1162 (1909) error dism.
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heritance tax at the death of the donor without reducing the donee's
control of the propertyY
B. Future Interests
The creation of a future interest is a useful device in any attempt
to reduce inheritance taxes. When property subject to imposition of
the tax passes divided into two or more estates, each estate is taxed
separately and according to its value at the death of the decedent.t8
Thus, if a testator dies leaving a life estate in his widow, remainder
in their two children, the transfer will receive the statutory exemp-
tion" upon the life estate of the widow as well as the exemption on
the remainder interest in each child."9 Of course, it is normally unde-
sirable in an estate plan to create a future interest that may pass
through the estate of a deceased person while it is still a future in-
terest."'
Calvert v. Thompson"3 may also avail a taxpayer of previously de-
nied inheritance tax benefits through prudent estate planning. In that
case the testator devised and bequeathed all his property to his wife
for life with full power to sell or otherwise to dispose of the property.
At the death of the wife the remainder of the property was to pass
equally to their two children in fee simple. The court held that the
power of disposal given the life tenant did not change the estate to
something other than a life estate.33 In addition, the trial court was
" Apparently the inheritance tax saving available under the Thompson case is limited
only by the tax assessed against the life estate. For example, a devise of a life estate with
a general power of appointment (or general power of sale or disposition) coupled with a
remainder to a qualified charity would be taxed only on the life estate interest, the re-
mainder being exempt because of the qualified charity. The life tenant could then exercise
the power and prohibit the charity from ever receiving the property, even though the
remainder was not subject to inheritance tax upon the testator's death. If the power is
exercised inter vivos or is a special power, no Texas tax will ever be assessed on the re-
mainder.
" Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.08 (1959):
If the property passing as aforesaid shall be divided into two or more estates,
as an estate for years or for life and a remainder, the tax shall be levied on
each estate or interest separately, according to the value of the same at the
death of the decedent. The value of estates for years, estates for life, remain-
ders, and annuities shall be determined by the "Actuaries Combined Experience
Tables," at four per cent compound interest.
"
9 Tex. Tax-Gem. Ann. art. 14.02 (1959).
"
5 Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.02 (1959).
3' Casner, op. cit. supra note 9, at 436.
32339 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960-Austin) error ref.; see note 27 supra and
accompanying text.
"aBy reaching this decision the court, relying on Weir v. Smith, 62 Tex. 1 (1884),
stated the general rule that if a particular estate is expressly created with a general power
of disposition to the person to whom such estate is given, then the power will not enlarge
the estate given. Furthermore, the court quotes with approval Edds v. Mitchell, 143 Tex.
307, 184 S.W.2d 823 (1945), where the Texas Supreme Court said:
The power of disposition is not an estate. It is merely authority derived
from the will to dispose of the fee. It is not repugnant to an estate for life.
1962]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
sustained in its computation of the inheritance tax without regard to
the power possessed by the life tenant. 4 This latter holding complete-
ly repudiates the policy of assessing the inheritance tax according to
the most probable disposition of the estate by the life tenant. Instead,
it establishes the requirement of valuing each estate or interest at the
death of the decedent, irrespective of any power possessed by one of
the parties.3" Therefore, a devise of a life estate with a power and re-
mainder over can be used to reduce the inheritance taxes without
hindering the use of the property by the life tenant.
Prior to Thompson the Attorney General had classified all remain-
ders, vested and contingent, as "uncertain future interests," and the
inheritance tax had been assessed according to the probability that
the particular interest would eventually come into the possession and
enjoyment of the beneficiary." However, the broad language of the
Thompson case should be interpreted as a rejection of any method of
computing the inheritance tax other than the method set forth in the
statute. The statutory language is "clear and unambiguous" in re-
quiring a valuation of the estates and interests in the property at the
date of the decedent's death. 7 The holdings of both Thompson"s and
It is not repugnant to the remainder, but when exercised, it defeats the re-
mainder in the property sold or conveyed. Calpes v. Ward, 107 Tex. 341,
179 S.W. 856.
34 The "most probable future disposition" test permitted the disregard of the remainder
interests in the computation of the inheritance tax due. Thus, the life tenant could be
taxed on the entire value of the property if the "most probable future disposition" would
be found to be an exercise of the power. For example, testator devised all of his property
valued at $100,000 to his wife for life, and the wife had full power to sell, convey, and
dispose of the property; upon death of the wife any property that remained in her possession
should pass to their daughter. The "most probable future disposition" test would permit
the entire value of the property to be taxed as though it passed to the wife in fee. See
Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 0-2351 (July 25, 1940).
s The court stated:
The statute . . . is plain in providing the method for determining the value
of estates for life and remainders and any other method of determining such
values would violate the statute.
Appellants urge us to accept opinions of the Attorney General and depart-
mental construction of [art. 14.08] as to the proper method of computing
inheritance taxes which are contrary to what we have said. There is no
ambiguity in the statute but the ambiguity arises if at all because of the
power of disposition granted to the life tenant. The effect of this power
has been determined by our Supreme Court and the opinions of the Attorney
General and departmental construction must yield. 339 S.W.2d at 688.
" The testator left property in trust for the lives of her two sisters with the remainder
in a nephew. If the nephew did not survive the two life tenants the property was to
pass to a tax exempt charity. The Attorney General held that the inheritance tax was
to be assessed on the basis of the happening of the "most probable contingency" and dis-
regarded the charity. Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 0-4751 (Aug. 26, 1942).
" Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.08 (1959).
' 5339 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960-Austin) error ref.
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the Attorney General" are consistent only in that they disregard com-
mon law distinctions among remainders in the determination of the
tax.
The use of future interests in an estate plan may be the most sig-
nificant device in the reduction of inheritance taxes without suffering
adverse consequences in the federal estate tax assessment. Since the
exemptions available under the Texas statute are not affected because
the future interest created is contingent, and the tax is assessed with-
out regard to the contingency, the use of such future interests will
not only permit a reduction in the inheritance taxes on the passing of
the donor's estate but will also avoid any inheritance tax consequences
on the passing of the life beneficiary's estate." The division of the
property among several beneficiaries will permit additional exemp-
tions which normally reduce the inheritance tax assessment.4
C. Life Insurance
The Texas inheritance tax is imposed on all insurance proceeds
taken out by the decedent on his own life with the exception of a
forty thousand dollar exemption for policies payable to named bene-
ficiaries.4
The Texas Supreme Court has held that where life insurance is
taken out by a husband on his own life, the premiums are paid from
the community estate, and the wife is beneficiary of the insurance,
only one-half of such insurance proceeds, less the statutory exemp-
tion, will be subject to the inheritance tax on the death of the in-
sured.4" This result has been extended by the Attorney General to
situations where the beneficiary is not the wife, but a third party."
Similarly, it has been held that the estate of a deceased wife includes
one-half of the cash surrender value of a policy on her husband's
life if the insured husband survives his wife, the premiums are paid
a9Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 0-4751 (Aug. 26, 1942).4 0 See Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.02-.06 (1959).
" Suppose the testator devised his property in trust for his wife for life, remainder
to his children who attain twenty-one years. It is submitted that this basic situation can
reduce the assessment of inheritance tax at the testator's death and yet the property will
not be in his children's gross estate if death should come prior to their twenty-first birth-
day. The contingency of the children's interest will not prohibit the reduction of the
inheritance tax by dividing the estate with the contingent remainders.
42 Tex. Tax--Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959):
All property within the jurisdiction of this state . . . including the proceeds
of life insurance to the extent of the amount receivable by the executor or
administrator as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon
his own life, and to the extent of the excess over Forty Thousand ($40,000)
Dollars of the amount received by all other beneficiaries as insurance under
policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life. . ..4
aBlackman v. Hansen, 140 Tex. 536, 169 S.W.2d 962 (1943).
"Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 0-5211 (May 15, 1943).
1962]
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from community funds, and the policy is acquired during marriage. '
These interpretations emphasize the basic question in considering
life insurance, namely, when is life insurance "taken out by the de-
cedent upon his own life" within the meaning of the Texas inheri-
tance tax statute?
The Texas life insurance provision" (in regard to inheritance tax-
es) is based on the federal statute in effect in 1939.47 It has long been
the Texas rule to presume that the Texas Legislature knows of the
construction given a statute at the time of its adoption and that it in-
tends to adopt the statute as construed by the federal and state
courts." Therefore, the interpretation of the federal statute in Lang
v. Commissioner" is of particular significance.
That case involved a life insurance contract which had been pur-
chased with community funds and which gave the decedent-insured
power to change the beneficiary at any time. Under the applicable
state law, as in Texas, s" such contracts were community property
whose character the insured could not alter by changing the benefi-
ciary. The Court assessed the tax only on the portion of the proceeds
that were purchased by premiums from the decedent's property; thus,
only one-half the proceeds were includable in the decedent's estate.
In determining what constitutes a policy "taken out by the dece-
dent," the Court reasoned that Congress had not intended that pro-
ceeds of insurance policies bought and paid for with funds of a per-
son other than the insured and not payable to the insured's estate,
"5 Calvert v. Thompson, 301 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957-Austin) no writ hist.
In an opinion controlled by this case the Attorney General ruled that where a decedent
willed the residue of her estate to three named beneficiaries, for inheritance tax purposes the
decedent's one-half community interest in the cash surrender value of certain insurance
policies on the surviving spouse's life passed to the beneficiaries and the inheritance taxes
should be computed accordingly. Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. WW-446 (June 6, 1958).
4STex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959).
41 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(g), 44 Stat. 9, provided:
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including
the value at the time of his death of all property .. .
(g) Proceeds of life insurance.-To the extent of the amount receivable by
the executor as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his
own life; and to the extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receiv-
able by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the
decedent upon his own life.
48Blackman v. Hansen, 140 Tex. 536, 169 S.W.2d 962 (1943); Board of Water Eng'r
v. McKnight, 111 Tex. 82, 229 S.W. 301 (1921); City of Tyler v. St. Louis Ry., 99
Tex. 491, 91 S.W. 1 (1906); Brothers v. Mundell, Mungesheimer & Co., 60 Tex. 240
(1884).
49304 U.S. 264 (1938).
5
In Blackman v. Hansen, 140 Tex. 536, 169 S.W.2d 962 (1943), the supreme court
held that the proceeds of a life insurance policy taken out by the husband and payable to
the estate of the decedent, the premiums of which were paid for with community funds,
are one-half the property of the wife and that that portion is no part of the estate of
the husband.
[Vol. 16
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would be considered as part of the decedent's estate for purposes of
taxation. 1
The Texas Supreme Court expressly approved this decision in an
interpretation of the inheritance tax statute in Blackman v. Hansen.52
Furthermore, the Attorney General, following the Lang and Black-
man cases, has ruled that "taken out by the decedent" means the ex-
penditure of the decedent's funds. 3
These decisions indicate that the maximum benefit from the assign-
ment of an insurance policy can be obtained only when the premium
payments are made by someone other than the insured. Although
this problem is easily solved when the third party beneficiary has
separate property from which to make the premium payments, a more
difficult situation is presented when the beneficiaries of the policy
are the spouse or minor children of the insured who have no separate
property. In the situation of the spouse serious consideration should
be given the possibility of partitioning a portion of the community
property, 4 thereby permitting the wife to make the premium pay-
ments from her separate estate. The partition will cause no adverse
federal tax consequences, and since the premiums are all paid by the
wife's separate estate, she will avoid the inheritance tax assessment
" The Supreme Court also relied on Treasury Regulations promulgated under the
Revenue Act of 1926. The Court stated:
Art. 25 ....
The term "insurance" refers to life insurance of every description .... Insur-
ance is deemed to be taken out by the decedent in all cases where he pays all
the premiums, either directly or indirectly, whether or not he makes the
application. On the other hand, the insurance is not deemed taken out by the
decedent, even though the application is made by him, where all the premiums
are actually paid by the beneficiary; where a portion of the premiums were
paid by the beneficiary and the remaining portion by the decedent the insur-
ance will be deemed to have been taken out by the latter in the proportion
that the premiums paid by him bear to the total of premiums paid.
Art. 28.
The amount to be returned where the policy is payable to or for the benefit
of the estate is the amount receivable. Where proceeds of a policy are pay-
able to a beneficiary other than to or for the benefit of the estate, and all
the premiums were paid by the decedent, the amount to be listed on Schedule
C of the return is the full amount receivable, but where the proceeds are so
payable and only a portion of the premiums were paid by the decedent, the
amount to be listed on such schedule is that proportion of the insurance
receivable which the premiums paid by the decedent bears to the total
premiums paid . . . . 304 U.S. at 269.
52 140 Tex. 536, 540, 169 S.W.2d 962, 964. The supreme court stated:
Before the 1939 amendment of (art. 14.01] the Federal statute had been
construed by the United States Supreme Court in Lang v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue . . . . That was the construction of the Federal statute at
the time of its adoption by the Legislature of this State.
55 Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 0-5211 (May 15, 1943).
"4 See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4624a (1950).
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upon the death of her husband." This follows from the Lang and
Blackman casess in that the policies are not "taken out by the dece-
dent." Moreover, when the assignment of a policy is to the children
(or any third party) the insured may make an outright gift of funds
to the beneficiary (and such funds becoming the separate property
of the beneficiary would be used to make the premium payments) or
possibly arrange for a trust to make the premium payments.
The method in which the inheritance tax is assessed on life insur-
ance proceeds is an important consideration in deciding the question
of whether to assign a policy to a third party. In the situation where
the life insurance premiums have been paid with community funds
and the proceeds are payable to a third party beneficiary, upon the
death of the insured, only one-half of the proceeds is included in
the insured-decedent's gross estate." The remaining one-half of the
proceeds will be subject to the federal gift tax, as a gift from the sur-
viving spouse to the third party beneficiary." However, if an assign-
ment is made of the policy before the insured's death, instead of the
federal gift tax being assessed on the face value of the policy at the
time of the death of the insured, the tax will be assessed on one-half
the cash surrender value of the policy at the time of the inter vivos
transfer. 9 Thus, such an assignment represents an important poten-
tial method of lessening taxes at death.
D. Annuities And Employee Death Benefits
The federal estate tax provision regarding employee death benefits"0
has no counterpart in the Texas statute. Consequently, such benefits
in Texas probably will be taxed as a transfer "made or intended to
take effect in possession and enjoyment after the death of the grantor
or donor."'" The assessment of the Texas tax under this provision
eliminates most, if not all, of the distinctions and factors in deter-
mining taxability under the federal estate tax. Although no Texas
court has ruled on the matter, in most jurisdictions assessing an in-
heritance tax it has been uniformly held that retirement and pension
" Should the beneficiary spouse predecease the insured, the cash surrender value of
the policy will be subject to the inheritance tax. However, it is submitted that the re-
duction in the inheritance tax will justify the inclusion. It will be remembered that if
the premiums are paid with community funds and the beneficiary spouse survives the insured,
one-half of the cash surrender value will be subject to the Texas tax. See Calvert v.
Thompson, 301 S.W.2d 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947-Austin) no writ list.
5 See notes 49, 52 supra and accompanying text.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042.
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2501, 2511.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2512.6 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2039.
"'Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959).
[Vol. 16
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plan annuities, as well as benefits from employee profit sharing plans,
are subject to the tax."2 The courts reason that the shifting of the
economic benefits at the death of the transferor sustains the imposi-
tion of the tax as a "transfer intended to take effect . . . after the
death of the grantor or donor. 3
The Texas Attorney General has consistently ruled, with one ex-
ception," that employee death benefits are subject to the inheritance
tax." The basic standard used in each ruling seems to be the control
of the decedent over the property at the time of his death. The most
enlightening interpretation of the taxability of survivorship benefits
under the Texas statute involved a ruling on an employee pension
plan where the bulk of the benefits were directly financed through
the purchase of annuity contracts from insurance companies."6 In
taxing the benefits under the plan the controlling factor apparently
was the power of the decedent at the time of his death to change the
beneficiary."' The Attorney General also ruled that an employer's con-
6" In assessing the inheritance tax, the courts have relied on the provision taxing
transfers "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death." In regards
to profit sharing funds, see In re Brackett's Estate, 342 Mich. 195, 69 N.W.2d 164 (1955).
In regards to annuity contracts, see Dolak v. Sullivan, 145 Conn. 497, 144 A.2d 312
(1958); Borchard v. Connelly, 140 Conn. 491, 101 A.2d 497 (1953); Cruthers v. Neeld,
14 N.J. 497, 103 A.2d 153 (1954). Contra, In re Willson's Estate, 143 Misc. 742, 257
N.Y. Supp. 230 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
"3The so-called "economic benefits" theory is based on the apparent intent of the
Legislature to tax the shifting of the enjoyment of property-the "economic benefits"-
from a former owner at his death, even though such shifting of enjoyment followed
necessarily from a prior inter vivos transfer of title. See In re Brackett's Estate, supra note
62; Borchard v. Connelly, supra note 62.
64This exception pertained to the lump sum death payment of a widow under the
Social Security Act. In holding such a payment not to be a "transfer intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment after the death of the grantor or donor," the Attorney
General stated:
The covered employee having no choice in the matter of coverage, nor in
the selection of beneficiaries, nor indeed any assurance that either he or anyone
else will ever receive any Social Security benefits, can scarcely be said to have
made a gift intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after death.
Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. WW-698 (Sept. 9, 1959).
63The following benefits have been expressly ruled subject to tax: (1) death benefits
under the Teachers' Retirement System, Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. WW-92 (Oct. 17, 1957);
(2) Series E United States Government Bonds, Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 0-7495 (Dec. 17,
1946); (3) the portion of a widow's annuity which is attributable to the decedent's con-
tributions to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund, Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No.
WW-698 (Sept. 9, 1959).
660 Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. S-177 (Sept. 30, 1955).
6 After holding that the "transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
after death of grantor" provision was applicable, the opinion stated:
In the present case, at the time of his death the decedent had a vested
right to at least 120 monthly retirement benefits. We regard as immaterial
the fact that this right had not vested at the time he designated the bene-
ficiary. He could have changed that designation at any time after the interest
in question vested. We think his failure to do so constituted an effective gift
intended to take effect at his death.
Moreover, we do not think the nature of the interest as vested or con-
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tribution to the plan would be treated as an additional compensation,
thereby subjecting only one-half of the pension benefits to the in-
heritance tax."s
The broad language used by the courts and the Attorney General
in deciding the taxability of survivorship benefits indicates that the
inheritance tax will be assessed in almost every instance, although un-
usual circumstances may cause a relaxing of the rule. In those situa-
tions where the annuitant or employee can irrevocably assign a pre-
sent interest in the enjoyment and possession of the benefits, the tax
can effectively be avoided.59 Usually, however, the inheritance tax
considerations with respect to annuities will yield to policies directed
at securing the advantages of the federal estate tax."
In those instances where the employee death benefits consist of
group life insurance proceeds, the previously mentioned considera-
tions pertaining to life insurance should be examined.7 Of course, it
should be noted that an annuity contract is not the same as an insur-
ance contract in Texas"2 and that annuity proceeds do not come with-
in the provision "proceeds of life insurance"" in the inheritance tax
statute. Therefore, the life insurance exemption is unavailable to
such proceeds."4
E. Trusts
Through proper utilization of the trust device, significant ad-
vantages may be attained in both the federal income" and estate"'
tax assessments. However, the basic distinction between the estate
tax and the inheritance tax permits the imposition of the state in-
heritance tax even though the estate plan has successfully avoided
tingent should be the determinative factor of taxability for inheritance tax
purposes when survivorship benefits are involved. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
e Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. S-117 (Sept. 30, 1955).
9 The test is always whether the property comes into possession and enjoyment of the
transferee upon the death of the transferor. If the death of the transferor makes no differ-
ence on the rights of the parties there is no tax. See In re Brackett's Estate, 342 Mich. 111,
69 N.W.2d 164 (1955); cf. Bethea v. Sheppard, 143 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940-
Austin) error ref.
70 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2039.
71 See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
72 In Daniel v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 102 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937-
Austin) no writ hist., the court reasoned that an annuity contract is essentially a form
of investment and lacks the character of "risk which is connected with the business of
writing insurance."73Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959).
"Dolak v. Sullivan, 145 Conn. 497, 144 A.2d 312 (1958); Borchard v. Connelly, 140
Conn. 491, 101 A.2d 497 (1953); Cruthers v. Neeld, 14 N.J. 497, 103 A.2d 153 (1954);
Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. S-177 (Sept. 30, 1955).
" See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 55 671-78.
"See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 55 2031, 2033.
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the federal estate tax." It is in this area of taxation that the Texas
statute8 has a much greater scope than its federal counterpart. TM
A common situation arises when there is an inter vivos transfer
in which the transferor parts with all rights of enjoyment, reversion,
or revocation." Except in the case of an absolute gift, these transfers
normally take the form of an irrevocable trust. Although such a con-
veyance may be effective to escape the federal estate tax,"' the Texas
courts,8 ' consistent with other jurisdictions, 8 have imposed the in-
heritance tax on these transfers under certain circumstances.
The leading Texas case, Bethea v. Sheppard,4 involved a joint will
and trust agreement covering the entire community estate. Upon the
husband's death an irrevocable trust with an income interest and
certain powers to invade the corpus was established naming the sur-
viving wife and daughter as beneficiaries. The daughter was the ul-
timate beneficiary of the trust, provided she survive the death of
the surviving spouse by eight years. Texas inheritance taxes were paid
on the husband's one-half of the community estate. Upon the death
of the surviving wife, the daughter contested the assessment of the
inheritance tax on the surviving spouse's one-half interest of the
community estate. In assessing the tax on the interest, the court held
that the transfer of the property was within that provision of the
Texas statute which assessed a tax on the passing of property intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment after the death of the
donor. "
Although the decision is apparently based on the contingency that
the ultimate beneficiary will survive the settlor, the broad language
" Cf. Chase v. Commissioner of Taxation, 226 Minn. 521, 33 N.W.2d 706 (1948);
Bethea v. Sheppard, 143 S.W.2d 997 (Tex, Civ. App. 1940-Austin) error ref.
"'Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959).
79 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2037.
so See Brink, Minnesota Inheritance Tax: Some Problems and Solutions, 43 Minn. L.
Rev. 443, 466 (1959).
sInt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2031, 2033. But see Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2035,
2037.
" Bethea v. Sheppard, 143 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940-Austin) error ref.;
accord, Cahn v. Calvert, 159 Tex. 385, 321 S.W.2d 869 (1959).
"
3 State St. Trust Co. v. Stevens, 209 Mass. 373, 95 N.E. 851 (1911); Chase v. Com-
missioner of Taxation, 226 Minn. 521, 33 N.W.2d 706 (1948); In re Holland's Estate,
123 N.J. Eq. 52, 195 Atl. 805 (Ch. 1938). Contra, In re Heine's Estate, 100 N.E.2d 545
(Ohio P. Ct. 1950).
84 143 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940-Austin) error ref.
8"Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959):
All property . .. and any interest therein which shall pass absolutely or in
trust by will or by the laws of descent or distribution . . ., or by deed,
grant, sale, or gift made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
after the death of the grantor or donor .... (Emphasis added.)
1962]
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of the court indicates a wide application of the provision."6 According
to this interpretation any interest in the possession or enjoyment of
property that becomes effective in the transferee at the transferor's
death will be subject to tax. Furthermore, in addition to the Bethea v.
Sheppard situation, it seems clear that at least two other types of ir-
revocable inter vivos trusts will be held taxable. The first such trust
involves a transfer in which the settlor has retained the right to in-
come. 7 The other taxable transfer is the creation of a trust providing
that income is payable to the beneficiary until the death of the settlor
at which time the remainder passes to the beneficiary. Here the suc-
cession to the remainder is subject to tax.8
These decisions may deter the creation of an inter vivos trust where
the benefits of possession and enjoyment pass at the death of the
settlor. Even though the federal estate tax benefits may be obtained,
the amount of the state inheritance tax assessment may be of suffi-
cient size to require serious consideration of other possible alterna-
tives.
For example, the irrevocable inter vivos trust is often used as a
receptacle for the assignment of life insurance policies in an effort
to reduce the settlor's federal estate tax liability. 9 Normally, good
estate planning prohibits the vesting of a future interest in the trust
beneficiary;" therefore, the irrevocable trust should require the bene-
ficiary to survive the settlor. However, the Attorney General has
ruled that the requirement that the beneficiary survive the settlor
s Speaking for the court, Justice Blair stated:
Under the Federal Estate Tax Law, the primary question is to determine
when the decedent or grantor parted with all property rights. Under our
State Inheritance or Succession Tax Statute, the primary question is whether
the transfer was made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
after the death of the grantor or settlor, particularly in the cases of transfer
of property in trust. It is not a question of when the beneficial interest is
created, but the tax is imposed upon the right to receive in possession or en-
joyment after the death of the grantor or settlor. In consequence, a grantor or
settlor may create an irrevocable trust during his lifetime, still if he postpones
the right of possession or enjoyment of the beneficiary until after the grantor's
death, the property or any interest therein is subject to the inheritance or
succession tax at or after death. Under our statute, where either "possession"
or "enjoyment" is made contingent upon the death of the grantor or settlor of
all or any part of the trust estate, such transfer is taxable. 143 S.W.2d 997,
1002-03 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940-Austin) error ref. (Emphasis added.)
9 Bethea v. Sheppard, 143 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940-Austin) error ref.;
Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 0-5002 (May 5, 1943), provided for the assessment of the tax
when the settlor retained an income interest for life as well as a contingent reversionary
interest.
"SState St. Trust Co. v. Stevens, 209 Mass. 373, 9s N.E. 851 (1911); Chase v. Com-
missioner of Taxation, 226 Minn. 521, 33 N.W.2d 706 (1948); Bethea v. Sheppard,
supra note 87.
'9 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042.
0 Casner, op. cit. supra note 9, at 436.
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is a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after
the death of the donor, and, therefore, the insurance proceeds are
subject to inheritance tax.' Thus, the apparent advantage of avoid-
ing the federal estate tax on the value of the life insurance policy,
should the trust beneficiary predecease the settlor, may be lost when
the Texas inheritance tax liability is determined at the settlor's death
and the property passes to the beneficiary.
F. Transfer In Contemplation Of Death
The Texas statute imposing an inheritance tax on transfers in
contemplation of death" is distinguishable from the corresponding
federal estate tax provision" in two important aspects. First, the
Texas transfer must involve a "material part of the estate" before
the inheritance tax will be assessed.9 Secondly, the federal statute pro-
hibits any transfer made more than three years before the testator's
death from being taxed as a gift in contemplation of death;9 where-
as, the Texas statute has no limitation on the period during which
the transfer may be considered as a gift in contemplation of death.
Therefore any gift made by a decedent may be considered as made
in contemplation of death. Moreover, the Attorney General has ruled
that the facts and circumstances of each case will determine whether
the transfer involves a "material part" 7 or an "adequate valuable
consideration." 9 Although this provision does not promote stability
for planning purposes, the distinctions between the Texas and the
federal statutes should be kept in mind.
"' Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 0-5063 (Dec. 13, 1943). In an earlier opinion the Attorney
General ruled that a vested beneficial interest in a trust subject to divestment on the
beneficiary's death without issue prior to the death of the settlor is subject to inheritance
tax. See Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 0-4142 (Aug. 31, 1942).
92 Suppose A, a widower, transfers two $50,000 life insurance policies to an irrevocable
inter vivos trust to be paid to his two sons in equal shares. If one of the sons predeceases
A, only the value of the policy will be subject to federal estate tax liability, and if this son
has no other assets, there will be no federal estate tax due. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 2042. Furthermore, if A predeceases his sons, no estate inheritance tax will be assessed
on the policies if the sons were not required to survive A. The tax saving is readily apparent,
and the size of A's estate passing to the sons will determine the final amount saved.
"STex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959):
Any transfer made by a grantor, vendor, or donor, whether by deed, grant,
sale, or gift, shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been
made in contemplation of death, and subject to the same tax as herein pro-
vided, if such transfer is made within two (2) years prior to the death of
the grantor, vendor, or donor, of a material part of his estate, or if the
transfer made within such period is in the nature of a final distribution of
property and without adequate valuable consideration.94 1nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035.95 Tex. Tax--Ge. Ann. art. 14.01 (1959).
9 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 2035(b).
" Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. V-264 (June 24, 1947).




The doctrine of election has long been an important concept in
the devise of Texas property. This concept not only significantly
assists in an orderly devolution of an estate, but in many instances
its proper utilization affords important federal tax benefits."
An election by a surviving widow to take under a will removes the
value of her community interest plus the value of the statutory ex-
emption from an inheritance tax assessment. " However, to the ex-
tent that property received under a will exceeds these two amounts,
an assessment is proper. Thus it is obvious that there should be care-
fully planned inter vivos dispositions of at least a portion of the sep-
arate property of the person forcing the election.
With respect to the remaining beneficiaries of a will, a surviving
spouse's election to take under that will requires a consideration of
whether only the decedent's one-half share or the entire community
estate is to be taxed as passing under the will of the decedent. In
Calvert v. Fort Worth Nat'l Bank,"1 the Texas Supreme Court ruled
that the inheritance tax could be assessed only upon the decedent's
one-half of the community estate.
In that case the husband established a testamentary trust disposing
of his separate property and all of the community estate. Upon the
widow's election to take under the will, the state contended that the
whole community interest was subject to the inheritance tax assess-
ment on the theory that it passed from the decedent.
The supreme court rejected the state's contention for two reasons.
First was the fact that the legislature had in other instances been
explicit when property of persons other than the decedent was to be
"' The doctrine of election has been defined to mean
that a legatee or devisee under a will is put to the choice of accepting the
beneficial interest offered by the donor in lieu of some estate which he is
entitled to, but which is being taken from him by the terms of the will.
When by the express terms of the will the party is put to an election, he
must make a choice regardless of the relative value of the two inconsistent
rights. To uphold an election the compensating thing need not be of value
equal to that taken away. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 315, 32 S.W. 620,
626 (1935).
See Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955); Smith v. Butler, 85 Tex.
126, 19 S.W. 1083 (1892).
For purposes of simplicity, this section of the Article is worded in terms of a "widow's
election." However, the concepts discussed are equally applicable to a husband who is put
to an election under the will of his wife.
For detailed treatment of the widow's election with emphasis on the federal tax aspects,
see Westfall, Estate Planning and the Widow's Election, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1269 (1958);
Comment, The Widow's Election: A Study in Three Parts, 15 Sw. L.J. 85 (1961).
o00 Jones v. State, 5 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Com. App. 1928).
'0' Tex. -, 356 S.W.2d 918 (1962).
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considered as passing by will, and hence subject to the inheritance
tax.'02
The second ground for not taxing the full community estate was
based upon the fact that the wife's one-half share of community
property did not pass by the decedent's will but passed because of
the election by the widow. The court stated:
It is manifest that no tax liability with respect to Mrs. Taylor's com-
munity interest accrued at the death of her husband or upon the
probate of his will, because her interest did not and could not pass
solely by virtue of such will. Before it could be said that Mrs. Taylor's
interest had passed by any means, a further voluntary and affirmative
action on her part was required. It was not until she elected to take
under and in accordance with the provisions of the will that the
trustee became entitled to her interest in the community property.
Although the election when made might be held for some purposes to
relate back to Mr. Taylor's death, the effective legal act was the
voluntary election of the living wife and not the testamentary dis-
position of the deceased husband. It seems clear to us then that Mrs.
Taylor's community interest did not pass to the trustee by her hus-
band's will within the meaning of Article 14.01.1"3
The court distinguished those cases" 4 holding that where the widow
takes under the will, the entire community interest passes under the
will as if the entire estate had always belonged to the testator. The
distinction was based upon the fact that those controversies involved
title questions between the widow and heirs while this case involved
an inheritance tax problem controlled by statute.
The case, therefore, seems clearly to settle the rule that in those
situations where the widow elects to take under the will, only one-
half of the community estate will be subject to the inheritance tax.
However, this does not mean that the widow's share of the com-
munity property will escape the inheritance tax upon her death. At
that time her one-half share may be subject to the inheritance tax
as a transfer made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment after death under the doctrine of Bethea v. Sheppard."'
.0. The court pointed out that article 14.01 expressly includes: (1) property passing
under a general power of appointment exercised by the decedent by will; (2) certain life
insurance proceeds; (3) transfers made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment after death of the grantor or donor; and (4) transfers in contemplation of death.
103 Tex. -, 356 S.W.2d at 922.
14 See Graser v. Graser, 147 Tex. 404, 215 S.W.2d 867 (1949); Dakan v. Dakan, 125
Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935); Kelly v. Kelly, 294 S.W. 518 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927).
"' 143 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940-Austin) error s'ef. See note 84 supra and
accompanying text. The court in the Fort Worth Nat'l Bank case said in this respect
"Whether the right of succession to such interest [the widow's one-half share of the
community property] is taxable as a transfer made by her in contemplation of death or
to take effect in possession or enjoyment after death is a question which must be determined





An estate tax is levied against the entire estate as a unit, while an
inheritance tax is levied against the distributive share of each benefi-
ciary of the estate."'6 In harmony with the virtually uniform rule, '
the Texas inheritance tax rates and exemptions are determined by the
relationship of the beneficiary to the decedent.' The relationship
of the beneficiary will cause the inheritance tax rate to vary, as well
as the amount exempt from tax. In the normal situation these varia-
tions will have no effect on the testamentary disposition of the dece-
dent's property. However, in certain circumstances a consideration
of the rates and exemptions will favor transferring property to one
beneficiary by inter vivos gift and to other beneficiaries by testa-
mentary disposition.0 9
B. Charitable Exemption
In most circumstances an estate plan will have a charitable disposi-
tion of a part of the property in the estate. Such disposition is ad-
vantageous under the federal income,"0 gift, and estate"' taxes;
thus, the donor of such a charitable disposition will receive federal
tax advantages in either an inter vivos or testamentary transfer to
a qualified charity. However, there are extreme limitations upon the
advantages of a charitable devise with respect to minimizing the
Texas inheritance tax.
The very nature of the inheritance tax prevents the other bene-
ficiaries of the estate from realizing any tax advantage on a charitable
devise of property. Since the inheritance tax is imposed on the pri-
vilege of succession to property, not the property,"' only the charity
receives any benefit from the exemption. Furthermore, the territorial
restriction of the Texas charitable exemption prescribes a careful
study of any such bequest if the donor desires a tax-exempt trans-
fer.1
4
'o Mahany, Texas Taxes 836 (1946).
107See Kidder, State Inheritance Tax and Taxability of Trusts 398 (1934).
"' See Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.02-.06 (1959).
.0. Compare Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.02 (1959), with Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art.
14.04 (1959).
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170.
' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2522.
"' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2055.
"'Cahn v. Calvert, 159 Tex. 385, 321 S.W.2d 869 (1959); State v. Hogg, 123 Tex.
568, 72 S.W.2d 593 (1934).
"t See Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.06 (1959):
Provided, however, that this Article shall not apply on property passing to
or for the use of the United States, or to or for the use of any religious,
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Prior to 1933, to qualify for the exemption a charity had to be
located in Texas, and the devise had to be used within the state."5
The mandatory location requirement was deleted by statutory
amendment in 1933, and only the restriction on using the property
within the state was retained.'16 The evolution of the exemption was
continued in 1959 when certain regional charities were permitted
tax-exempt status."7 Though these statutory amendments indicate
a relaxation of the territorial restriction, the estate planner should
be cautious in making any testamentary disposition of property to
a charity, since tax exemptions are construed against the taxpayers
claiming the exemption."'
The narrow exemption permitted charities under the Texas statute,
together with the sharp acceleration of tax rates to be applied to
property without tax-exempt status,"O presents strong reasons for an
inter vivos transfer of the property when the charity cannot qualify
for the exemption. Subject to certain exceptions, 12 an inter vivos
transfer of the property will be desired for federal tax reasons."'
Admittedly the impact of the Texas provision is sometimes reduced
by the deduction for state taxes permitted in the computation of the
educational, or charitable organization, incorporated, unincorporated, or in the
form of a trust, when such bequest, devise, or gift is to be used within this
state. The exemption from tax under the preceding provisions of this Article
shall without limiting its application under other appropriate circumstances,
apply to all or so much of any bequest, devise, or gift to or for the use of
the United States, or a religious, educational, or charitable organization, which
is, in writing and prior to the payment of the tax, irrevocably committed for
use exclusively within the State of Texas or transferred to a religious, edu-
cational or charitable organization for use exclusively within this state.
Provided, further, that if property so passing is to or for the use of a
religious, educational, or charitable organization which conducts its operations
on a regional basis, one such region of which includes the State of Texas, or
any part thereof, then a bequest, devise, or gift to be used within such region
shall be deemed to be used within this state.
For purposes of this paragraph a region shall comprise not more than
five contiguous states, either in whole or in part, one of which is the State
of Texas.
... See Texas Acts 1931, 42d Leg., ch. 72, at 109. In San Jacinto Nat'l Bank v. Sheppard,
125 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939-Austin) no writ hist., the court held that the
term "located" as used in the statute was used in the sense of domicile or residence of
a corporation and not merely to distinguish, generally, a foreign from a domestic corpora-
tion. However, in order to obtain the exemption, the corporation must use the devise or
gift within the state.
... See Texas Acts 1933, 43d Leg., ch. 192, at 581, 592.
.. See Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.06 (1959).
. See Texas Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Bass, 137 Tex. 1, 151 S.W.2d
567 (1941); accord, Hedgecroft v. City of Houston, 150 Tex. 654, 244 S.W.2d 632 (1951).
" See Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.06 (1959).
.. For example, by keeping property in the estate for a testamentary disposition to a
charity the marital deduction is increased. 2 Casner, Estate Planning 896 (3d ed. 1961).
... See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170; Casner, op. cit. supra note 120, at 880-87; Rice,
Family Tax Planning 154 (1960).
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federal estate tax."' However, that deduction does not resolve the
problem in most instances, and careful consideration should be given
any charitable disposition of property.
III. SPECIAL PROBLEMS
A. Marital Deduction
The Texas inheritance tax has no special exemption for property
passing to a surviving spouse. The absence of such an exemption is
an important distinction from the federal estate tax, which permits
a deduction of fifty per cent of the adjusted gross estate upon the
passing of that amount of property to the surviving spouse." 3 How-
ever, since one-half of the community property is excluded from the
adjusted gross estate,"" only when an estate consists of separate prop-
erty" will the federal marital deduction be a factor in an estate plan.
Admittedly, this deduction is important in the formulation of an
estate plan; however, in some circumstances the Texas inheritance
tax will lessen the effectiveness of the marital deduction.
In many instances an estate plan will require an inter vivos dis-
position of a portion of an estate to third persons. Where the estate
consists of both community and separate"' property the careful se-
lection of the property to be transferred may result in an effective
reduction in Texas inheritance tax liability. Although it may not
affect the federal gift'" and estate2 . tax liabilities, in most instances
an inter vivos transfer of separate property will produce the most
favorable inheritance tax results."' In making that choice it is im-
portant to note the lack of a special exemption on property passing
to a surviving spouse in the Texas statute. Because of the absence of
".. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 2053 (d).
.
2 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 2056.
224Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2056(c)(2)(B), -(C); 4 Mertens, Federal Gift and
Estate Taxation S 29.58 (1959).
.25 See Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. arts 4613, 4614 (1958).
12 Ibid.
127 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2513.
128 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056.
129 For example, a husband (H) and wife (W) have a community estate of $400,000
and H has separate property valued at $100,000. H and W desired to make an inter vivos
gift of $100,000 to their two children; further, it is desired that only the surviving
spouse and the children receive the property interests of the first spouse to die. Upon the
death of H, by qualifying for the federal estate tax marital deduction, the federal estate
tax liability will not be affected by the selection of the property for inter vivos transfer.
However, an inter vivos transfer of the separate property will permit a Texas inheritance
tax assessment of $3,650, while the retention of the separate property in the estate will
result in $5,450 inheritance tax liability. The inheritance tax liability is based on the
property passing to W in fee. Although a division of the estate by using future interests
will reduce the margin of difference in the inheritance tax, the decrease in the Texas
inheritance tax is established. Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.02 (1959).
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an exemption, retention of the separate property in the estate would
increase the amount of property subject to the Texas inheritance tax
by the amount of the possible federal estate tax marital deduction."'
Equally important in deciding to transfer the separate property is
the increase which occurs in the surviving spouse's federal income
tax basis in the community property without the necessity of in-
cluding the community interest in the estate of the decedent.'
There are many situations when the separate property will not be
selected for inter vivos disposition. In such circumstances, an estate
planner must examine the avenues available to reduce the Texas in-
heritance tax in conjunction with qualifying for the federal estate
tax marital deduction.' Unlike the gift tax,'33 in qualifying for the
federal estate tax marital deduction it should be remembered that it
is immaterial whether the decedent bequeathes his interest in com-
munity or separate property to the surviving spouse." It is only nec-
essary for the decedent to own separate property which is includible
in his gross estate."'
The Texas inheritance tax may still be reduced without sacrificing
the federal estate tax marital deduction. Through the proper use of
a general power of appointment. or a power of invasion... an estate
can qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction and yet re-
duce the Texas inheritance tax."' For example, a bequest of property
to the surviving spouse for life with a general power of appointment
will not only qualify for the marital deduction but will also reduce
the inheritance tax assessment."' Thus, the total death tax liability is
reduced effectively without impairing any plan of disposition.
330 To the extent the property would be community property, the Texas inheritance tax
would be assessed in any event. Only the fifty per cent available for the federal estate
tax marital deduction will be the increase in the property subject to the Texas inheritance
tax. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056.
I" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 1014(b) (6), -(7).
13 nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056.
... For gift tax purposes the marital deduction is inapplicable to a gift of property
which is community property at the time of the gift. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2523 (f).
1344 Mertens, op. cit. supra note 124.
13 Suppose H's community property interest is $200,000 and he also has $100,000 in
separate property. The maximum marital deduction available is $50,000. If H devises his
$200,000 interest to his surviving spouse in fee and the separate property to a third person,
the $50,000 federal estate tax marital deduction would be available, even though the
separate property passed to a third person.
13 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b) (5).
". Care must be taken to bring the gift within the terms of the statute. A power to
invade the corpus for the widow's needs or for her support will not achieve the desired
result since her rights are limited by objective standards. A power to sell or consume may
not include a power to give. Difficult questions of construction will arise whenever
language used creates any uncertainty. 1 Bowe, Estate Planning and Taxation 74 (1957).
... See note 8 supra and accompanying text.




A will generally places the burden of paying death taxes. The con-
sideration of the responsibility for such payments is important to
any estate plan. '° Since the Texas inheritance tax is neither an ex-
pense of administration nor a charge upon the general estate of the
decedent, 4 a provision in the will assessing the burden of the normal
expenses will not adequately place the death tax burden. The succes-
sive nature of an inheritance tax requires a charge against each share
or interest according to its value, and each beneficiary receives an
interest burdened with the inheritance tax imposed on the right to
receive the property.14' However, a specific provision in the will may
relieve the property passing to a beneficiary of the tax burden, pro-
vided the testamentary provision to such effect is clear and unequiv-
ocal.' 4'
The Texas courts have given these provisions strict interpreta-
tion.'" For example, when a will directed the executors "to pay such
legacies, all taxes, State, National, all debts, just and provable, against
my estate," a Texas court rejected a contention that the Texas in-
heritance taxes should be paid pursuant to the provision. 4' Therefore,
in drafting a will provision placing the burden of death taxes, the
provision should specifically mention inheritance taxes.
It is equally important to include a provision for payment of the
estate tax in the will. Though the Texas estate tax provides for ap-
portionment when there is an inheritance tax assessed against the
estate,40 there is no apportionment of the Texas estate tax when no
separate property. Assume that H wishes to leave a $100,000 interest to W sufficient to
qualify for the marital deduction. A bequest in fee to W (age 40) will result in a $1,250
Texas inheritance tax assessment. However, a life estate with a general power of appoint-
ment to W, remainder to H's two children will produce only a $457 inheritance tax liability.
1402 Casner, op. cit. supra note 120, at 1132-36.
'.. Norton v. Jones, 210 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948-Dallas) error ref.
14' Sinnott v. Gidney, 159 Tex. 366, 322 S.W.2d 507 (1959); Norton v. Jones, supra
note 141.
It is competent for a testator to specify what property or class of property
shall assume the burden of the tax on the transfer or the right of succession
of his estate, as for example, to provide that inheritance and estate taxes shall
be paid out of a general or residuary estate, or out of a particular fund.
Since the practical effect of such a provision is to increase the gift, the intent
of the testator to make such a gift will not be drawn from uncertain
language. Norton v. Jones, 210 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948-
Dallas) error ref.
144See cases cited note 142 supra.
141 In Norton v. Jones, 210 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948-Dallas) error ref., the
court gave special emphasis to the use of "my estate" in the clause placing the burden of
the death taxes. The court reasoned that since the estate did not owe an inheritance tax,
the use of the words "my estate" served expressly to exclude from consideration all taxes
due and owing by everyone else.
.. See Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. arts. 15.01-.03 (1959).
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inheritance tax is imposed on an estate.'47 Moreover, Texas has no
general apportionment statute, and where the taxable estate includes
only testamentary assets, 4 ' the Texas Supreme Court does not recog-
nize the apportionment rule."9 Thus, in absence of a provision in the
will directing otherwise, the estate tax attributable to testamentary
assets is not apportionable and the burden of the tax is determined
by the rules of law applicable to debts and expenses of administra-
tion."'
In those instances when the federal estate tax marital deduction is
desired, the devise to a surviving spouse should pass free from tax."'
Although an assessment of the inheritance tax does not disqualify
the devise for the marital deduction, the deduction will be diminished
by the amount of the inheritance tax liability."' Thus, the portion of
the estate to be used to satisfy the death tax liability should be clearly
identified in the will.
A testamentary charitable disposition of property requires more
than just an adequate identification of the charity. The territorial re-
striction of the Texas inheritance tax charitable exemption dictates
a provision restricting the use of the property to comply with the
statute."' The Texas courts"4 and the Attorney General"' indicate
that an express limitation on the property in the will is sufficient to
meet the requirements of the exemption. It is also important to assure
a tax-free passing of property to the charity. Though in some in-
stances an imposition of the inheritance tax will not affect the federal
estate tax liability,"' there are other situations when such an assess-
ment will increase the federal death tax liability by reducing the
federal estate tax charitable deduction." 7
147 See Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 15.04 (1959).
14
9
In Sinnott v. Sidney, 159 Tex. 366, 322 S.W.2d 507 (1959), the Texas Supreme
Court defined testamentary assets as "property passing under the will or by descent as
distinguished from that which, although includible in the estate, is not part of the
testamentary or intestate estate." 322 S.W.2d at 513.
14 Ibid.
.5. Ibid. In Thompson v. Thompson, 149 Tex. 632, 236 S.W.2d 779 (1951), after
holding the estate tax to be an expense of the administration, the Texas Supreme Court
held the orders of liability for such expenses, absent a will provision directing otherwise,
to be the following: (1) residuary estate, (2) personal property, and (3) real property.
"' See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b) (4) (A).
assFor example, assume that the only bequest to the surviving spouse is $100,000 and
the spouse is required to pay a state inheritance tax in the amount of $1,500. If no other
death taxes affect the net value of the bequest, the value for the purpose of the marital
deduction is $98,500. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b) (4) (c) (1961).
"'. See Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann art. 14.06 (1959).
'..Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Sheppard, 198 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1946-Austin) error ref. n.r.e. (by implication).
1"Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. S-198 (May 14, 1956).
"e See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 2053 (d); Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-9 (1961).




The preceding discussion clearly establishes that no estate plan can
be properly drafted without careful consideration of the Texas death
tax liability. Granted, in most instances the federal tax considerations
will control the disposition of property, but under certain circum-
stances, the inheritance tax can be effectively diminished without im-
pairing a possible reduction in federal estate tax liability.
In summary, in planning any estate subject to the Texas death tax
assessment there are certain factors that should be considered.
The following factors are the more important:
(1) In both the creation and exercise of a general power of
appointment the Texas death tax assessment emphasizes the advantage
of an inter vivos power;' 8 in addition, the possible passing of the
property in default of appointment should be carefully examined. 5 '
(2) The use of future interests should be an integral part of any
plan;'(" the case of Calvert v. Thompson"8 ' appears to be a command
for the use of future interests in the devolution of any Texas estate.
(3) In any attempt to remove life insurance proceeds from possible
taxation, payment of premiums by the insured should be avoided.''
Furthermore, care should be taken to secure the exemption upon the
payment of proceeds to a named beneficiary. 63
(4) The broad interpretation of the Texas inheritance tax pro-
vision regarding "transfers intended to take effect at or after death"
must always be considered in any inter vivos transfers of the estate.'
As noted, this provision is particularly hazardous in the creation of
irrevocable inter vivos trusts.''
(5) The selection of a testamentary charitable beneficiary should
be carefully examined; the proper restriction on the bequest for sole
use within the restricted area of the statute should be secured.""
(6) Under most circumstances the estate should first exhaust its
separate property in any inter vivos transfer of property;'. in the
event such property is unavailable for inter vivos disposition, the
158 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
159 See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
160 See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
.8. 339 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960-Austin) error ref.
162 See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
183 See note 42 supra.
104 See notes 67, 91 supra.
'"5 See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
166 See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
187 See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
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divided estate should always be used to reduce the inheritance tax
assessment.98
(7) The will should specifically provide for the burden of the
inheritance tax assessment; ' in addition the will should expressly
negate the exercise of any power of appointment possessed by the
estate when it is not desired to exercise the power. ° Finally, a charit-
able bequest should be restricted to comply with the statutory pro-
.• 171
vision.
These general considerations of the Texas death tax assessment in-
dicate that the tax has a twofold significance in an estate plan. It is
important as one of many factors to be considered in formulating
the plan. Moreover, upon formulation of the plan the avenues avail-
able to reduce the inheritance tax assessment must be examined to as-
sure maximum tax benefit.
"s See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
169 See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
170 See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
171 See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
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